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Abstract
This paper explores gender diﬀerences in "make- up" and "suspicion" in
a bargaining game in which the privately informed seller of a company
sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then pro-
poses a price for the company. "Make-up" is measured by how much
the true value is overstated, "suspicion" by how much the price oﬀer
diﬀers from the value message. We run diﬀerent computerized treat-
ments varying in information about the gender (constellation) and in
embeddedness of gender information. The asymmetry of the game and
of information allows for a robust assessment of gender (constellation)
eﬀects. We report here the results from just one shot round decision
since we expect such eﬀects to be more pronounced for inexperienced
participants. We mainly find an eﬀect of gender constellation: when fe-
male sellers are aware to confront a female buyer, they overstate more,
i.e. there is more "make-up". However, we cannot confirm gender (con-
stellation) eﬀects for suspicion.
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1 Introduction
Much of gender research in experimental economics focus on diﬀerences in risk,
delay, inequity, ... aversion to explain diﬀerences in subjects’ choices. In this
study, we are interested in the rather diﬀerent hypothesis that, due to gender
specific characteristics in bargaining, women are more suspicious than men and
feel less obliged to tell the truth. This hypothesis is based on the evidence that
persons belonging to groups that historically have been discriminated against
(e.g., minorities and women) are less likely to trust and therefore behaving
more strategically (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). Therefore, women could
have evolved as relatively more risk averse (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), but
also superior in detecting others’ trustworthiness and in strategizing (Buss,
2005). So far the evidence for such hypotheses is inconclusive (Eagly and
Wood, 1999).
We aim at verifying that women are more suspicious and strategizing than
men by using a modified "Acquiring-a-Company" game (Samuelson and Baz-
erman, 1985), in which the seller of the company, after learning its value, can
strategize when sending a value message to the potential buyer. The buyer
then proposes a price after having received the message without, but knowing
the value of the firm.1 Since the message can be truthful or not, the price
oﬀer will reflect not only the desired share of surplus from trade but also the
buyer’s suspicion: for a more suspicious buyer the diﬀerence of the message
received and the price proposed should be larger.
Since the experimental setting is one of bargaining whether to trade and,
if so, at which price, our study is in line with those on gender diﬀerences in
bargaining (Ayres and Siegelman 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Saad and
Tripatl, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Riley and McGinn 2002; Gneezy and Rustichini,
2004; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Sutter et al. 2009; García-Gallego 2012).
We add new insights to this strand of gender research since we study how
"make up", i.e. seller’s overstatement of the firm’s true value and "suspicion",
i.e. buyer’s underpricing of the value message, depend on gender and gender
constellation. Furthermore, we study how seller’s acceptance of price oﬀers
depends on gender and gender constellation.2
We expected women to "make-up" (strategize) more, to be more "suspi-
cious" (underprice more), and to accept to trade more frequently when bar-
1The “Acquiring-a-Company” game is often used as a simple environment to analyze the
“winner’s curse” (Kagel 1995, Thaler 1988). In a companion paper, we provide an analysis
of this eﬀect by using the data from repeated rounds (see Di Cagno et al. 2015).
2This step of the decision process resembles an ultimatum game. Therefore, our findings
can be compared to the results of gender diﬀerences in that framework.
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gaining with female rather than with male partners.
Our results are based on the first paid round of an experiment which in-
cludes subsequent repeated rounds. We concentrate here on this set of data
since we expect gender diﬀerences to emerge more clearly from choice behavior
of inexperienced participants, for whom the oﬀsetting eﬀect of experience and
learning are absent.
We find a significant eﬀect of the female-female constellation for making
up, i.e. sending value messages which overstate the true value of the firm.
On the contrary, the experimental hypothesis that women are more suspicious
than men is not confirmed by our analysis. However, the latter finding has to
be interpreted with care since suspicion, measured as underpricing the value
message, confounds the limited trust of that message with asking for a higher
share from the surplus of trade.
2 The Game and the Experiment Setup
We consider a modified "Acquiring-a-Company" game in which the seller, after
learning the firm’s value v, can send a value message v^ = v^(v) to the potential
buyer (Güth et al., 2014). The value of the firm is known only to the seller
and is randomly generated according to the uniform density, concentrated on
the interval (0; 1). The seller’s evaluation of the firm is qv with 0 < q < 1.
The parameter q is exogenously given and commonly known. After receiving
the value message bv, the buyer proposes a price p = p(v^) for acquiring the
company. If trade occurs, the gains from trade are v   p for buyer and p  qv
for seller, hence the surplus amounts to (1 q)v, which is always positive. The
seller can accept or reject the oﬀer, after which the game ends. The payoﬀ is
(p   qv) for the seller and (v   p) for the buyer, where  = (p; bv; v) = 1 if
the oﬀer is accepted and  = (p; bv; v) = 0 if it is rejected. According to the
benchmark solution, under the assumption of risk neutrality, the buyer oﬀers
p = 0 when q > 1
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, which the seller rejects, and p = q when q  1
2
, which the
seller accepts.
We run an experiment aimed at analyzing subjects’ acceptance decisions,
"make-up"   measured by the diﬀerence between the value message v^ and
the true value v   and "suspicion"   measured by the diﬀerence between the
value message v^ and the price oﬀer p   by controlling not only for gender
but also for gender constellation. To this aim, we ran twelve gender-balanced
sessions at the laboratory of Max Planck Institute in Jena. A total of 376
students of diﬀerent disciplines (11 sessions of 32 participants plus 1 session
of 24) were recruited among the undergraduate population of Jena University
3
using Orsee (Greiner, 2004). The experiment was fully computerized using
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).3
At the beginning of the experiment, half of participants were assigned to
the role of seller and half to the role of buyer. In each session, male and female
participants were evenly split in the two roles.
The basic decisions were taken in the following order. First, the computer
selects for each seller the value of the firm v according to a discrete uniform
distribution on (0,100) and communicates it only to each seller. Second, the
computer selects the value of q from a discrete uniform distribution concen-
trated on (0,1) and communicates it to both sellers and buyers. Third, the
seller decides the value message bv to send to the buyer. Fourth, after receiving
the value message, the buyer decides the price oﬀer and communicate it to the
seller. Finally, the seller decides whether to accept it or not. If she accepts,
the firm will be sold at the oﬀered price, while, if she does not, no trade takes
place. At the end of the round, the payoﬀs of buyers and sellers are calculated
by the computer and individually communicated.
We framed this decision process in three treatments diﬀering in informa-
tion only: in treatment U (Unknown), trading partners, randomly matched in
pairs, are unaware of other’s gender, which is known in treatment G (aware-
ness of gender constellations). Finally, in treatment E (embedded information
about the gender constellation) the field of study of both partners is added to
information on gender in order to control for demand eﬀects.
3 Main Findings
Proceeding as in backward induction, we begin with analyzing acceptance
decisions  by seller participants as depending on the profitability of the price
oﬀer.4
Observation 1 One mainly observes the predicted theoretical rational behav-
ior:  = 1 for p  qv and  = 0 for p < qv. There exist no gender (constella-
tion) eﬀect in acceptance behavior of seller participants (see Table 1).
These findings suggest that acceptance decision does not depend on the
share of surplus that the seller aims to gain and question other-regarding
3After reading the instructions (available from the authors upon request), participants
had to answer a few control questions before the experiment started.
4What this neglets is a direct eﬀect of the parameter q and the value v, which together
determine the surplus from trade, as well as of bv. We also checked the direct eﬀect of q and
v and the results do not change.
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Table 1: Seller’s acceptance  by treatment and gender
Treatments All G & E G E
Male 0.06
(0.05)
Treatment G -0.01 -0.08 -0.08
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Treatment E 0.07
(0.06)
male seller-female buyer -0.05 -0.02 -0.13 -0.05 -0.02 -0.00
(0.09) (0.08) (0.20) (0.24) (0.10) (0.08)
female seller-male buyer -0.06 -0.03 0.15 0.23 -0.14 -0.11
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12) (0.10)
female seller-female buyer -0.03 -0.08 -0.02
(0.09) (0.22) (0.10)
male seller-male buyer 0.03 0.08 0.02
(0.09) (0.22) (0.10)
profitability (p  qv) 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.71*** 0.71***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08)
Constant 0.07 0.20** 0.16** 0.02 -0.06 0.22** 0.19**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.20) (0.11) (0.09)
Observations 188 128 128 32 32 96 96
R squared 0.43 0.46 0.35 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49
Notes: OLS regressions. Coeﬃcients and Huber-White robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported.
Significance: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01
concerns: at least for situations when own generosity would let the other
gain whereas oneself suﬀers a (minor) loss, there is no evidence of pro-social
behavior according to acceptance data (only 1.8% of sellers accepted to trade
when p < qv). The seller accepts whenever he or she finds it convenient and
his or her decision is not aﬀected by a strategic behavior related to the price
oﬀer.
As far as "suspicion" is concerned, the price oﬀer by the buyer could be
influenced not only by suspiciousness about the value message but also by the
desire to obtain a higher share of the surplus from trade. Thus a buyer who
thinks the value message is truthful, i.e. expects v^(v) = v, may well propose a
price p < v^. Actually, for ultimatum experiments, Eckel and Grossman (2001)
find that women as proposer are more generous than men, that, in our set up,
corresponds to oﬀering a higher price. Thus more suspiciousness by female
buyers could be compensated by more generous price oﬀers. We do not claim
to distinguish pure suspicion and underpricing to guarantee a satisfactory own
share of the surplus but only maintain that more "suspicion" should increase
v^   p.
Observation 2 Male and female buyers do not diﬀer in "suspicion", i.e. we
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Table 2: Buyer’s oﬀered price p by treatment and gender
Treatments All G & E G E
Male 0.73 3.70 6.65 3.89
(7.18) (8.35) (22.38) (9.24)
Male v^ -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05
(0.14) (0.16) (0.40) (0.18)
Partner: Male -4.28 -28.97* 2.49
(8.59) (15.64) (9.54)
Partner Male  v^ 0.08 0.49* -0.03
(0.16) (0.26) (0.18)
Treatment G 2.39 2.14 2.51
(3.28) (3.05) (2.91)
Treatemtn E 0.06
(2.49)
q 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.22** 0.21** 0.17*** 0.17**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
v^ 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.41*** 0.57** 0.30 0.45*** 0.45***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.27) (0.21) (0.11) (0.12)
Constant -0.53 -1.65 2.39 -8.08 11.03 -0.35 0.28
(4.91) (5.65) (4.55) (19.50) (12.51) (6.00) (4.93)
Observations 188 128 128 32 32 96 96
R-squared 0.327 0.362 0.362 0.411 0.474 0.344 0.342
Notes: OLS regressions. Coeﬃcients and Huber-White robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported.
Significance: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01
cannot reject that v^ p is homogeneously distributed for male and female buyer
participants.
Note, however, the significantly lower prices oﬀered to male sellers in Treat-
ment G (see Table 2).5 This evidence could be explained by expecting that
male sellers overstate more, contrary to our "make-up" hypothesis, or by dis-
crimination of male sellers. Actually, Observation 3 below suggests no diﬀer-
ence in overstating which supports the latter explanation.
Observation 2 as such does not question the hypothesis that women have
evolved as more skeptical. The fact that we do not observe significant gender
(constellation) diﬀerences in our measure of suspiciousness may be due to male
buyers asking for a higher own share of the surplus from trade. This would
suggest that male sellers reveal more ambition also by more make up so that
the diﬀerence v^   v is larger for them than for female sellers. This, however,
can be rejected, as the following observation makes clear.
Observation 3 Male and female sellers do not diﬀer in "make up", i.e. we
cannot reject that v^ v is homogeneously distributed for male and female seller
5This result is quite in contrast to the finding of Garcia-Gallego et al. (2012) in a field
experiment.
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Table 3: Seller’s “make-up” (v^   v) by treatment and gender
Treatments All G & E G E
Male 1.49 1.53 -4.25 3.46
(2.70) (3.43) (6.85) (3.97)
Partner: Male -2.50 -17.63*** 2.54
(3.43) (6.09) (3.97)
Treatment G -1.54 0.81 0.81
(3.99) (3.93) (3.84)
Treatment E -2.35
(2.90)
Constant 5.86** 3.48 5.50** 7.19 13.88*** 2.52 2.98
(2.38) (2.53) (2.74) (5.32) (4.00) (2.68) (2.94)
Observations 188 128 128 32 32 96 96
R-squared 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.013 0.218 0.008 0.004
Notes: OLS regressions. Coeﬃcients and Huber-White robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported.
Significance: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01
participants (see Table 3).
Even though there is no gender eﬀect on making up, we find a gender
constellation eﬀect since, as stated by Observation 4, female sellers trading
with female buyers "make-up" significantly more.
Observation 4 In treatment G, there is more "make-up" in the female-female
constellation, i.e. there is evidence that women are more strategizing by over-
stating more, quite surprisingly, confronting a female buyer (see Table 4).
To further investigate the making up attitude, we report in Table 5 the
probabilities of stating a value message equal, greater or lower than the true
value of the firm for the pooled data from treatments G and E, which provide
common knowledge of gender constellation.
There is quite some heterogeneity in value messages sent by sellers: 52:13%
of them overstate (v^(v) > v), 26:60% understate (v^(v) < v), and 21:28% are
truthful (v^(v) = v). Furthermore, consistently with Observation 4, we find a
significant gender constellation eﬀect on the probability of overstating (P =
0:046). Therefore, we conclude that average overstating and its probability
are larger for the female-female constellation.
4 Conclusions
By a modification of the "Acquiring-a-Company" game, we studied in the lab
how "make-up", "suspicion" and acceptance in bargaining depend on gender
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Table 4: Seller’s “make-up” (v^   v) by treatment and gender constellation
Treatments All G & E G E
Treatment G -1.54 0.81 0.81
(3.89) (3.83) (3.83)
Treatment E -2.35
(2.90)
male seller-female buyer -2.62 -2.88 -3.84 10.88 -11.00 -7.46 -1.46
(3.94) (4.91) (4.97) (8.43) (7.73) (5.81) (5.94)
female seller-male buyer -6.36* -6.91 -7.88* -2.50 -24.38** -8.38 -2.38
(3.68) (4.69) (4.75) (9.50) (8.89) (5.26) (5.41)
female seller-female buyer 0.77 0.97 21.88** -6.00
(3.85) (4.93) (7.99) (5.71)
male seller-male buyer -0.97 -21.87** 6.00
(4.93) (7.99) (5.71)
Constant 8.65*** 6.45* 7.42** -2.50 19.38*** 9.71** 3.71
(3.24) (3.58) (3.71) (6.12) (5.13) (3.93) (4.14)
Observations 188 128 128 32 32 96 96
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.263 0.263 0.029 0.029
Notes: OLS regressions. Coeﬃcients and Huber-White robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported.
Significance: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01
Table 5: Truthtelling, overstating and understating the value message by gen-
der and gender constellation
female seller male seller P-value
Truthtelling 24.47 18.09 0.288
female buyer 21.88 15.63
male buyer 31.25 21.88
P-value 0.404 0.529
Overstating 50.00 54.26 0.562
female buyer 59.38 46.88
male buyer 34.38 59.38
P-value 0.046 0.324
Understating 25.53 27.66 0.743
female buyer 18.75 37.50
male buyer 34.38 18.75
P-value 0.162 0.098
Notes: This table considers data from Treatment G and Treatment E.
8
and gender constellation.
We find that female sellers make up significantly more and more frequently
when matched with the same gender.
There is a surprising degree of truth-telling and an even higher degree of
understating which, however, do not diﬀer across gender and gender constel-
lations. Moreover, we find no gender nor gender constellation eﬀect on ac-
ceptance and no evidence of pro-social behavior, not even in those situations
when generosity would let the other gain a lot at minor own loss. However, we
can confirm that women are more strategizing by overstating more and more
likely when confronting a female buyer.
Finally, at first sight it may seem that not being able to confirm that
women are more suspicious is not consistent with the literature which finds
significant, though conflicting, gender eﬀects. Eckel and Grossman (2001)
show that women are more generous as proposers in ultimatum experiments
while Garcia-Gallego et al. (2012) argue that they are less generous, and also
question the relevance of risk attitude.6
However, in our setting with asymmetric information and stochastic un-
certainty "take-it-or-leave-it" price oﬀers may not be gender (constellation)
biased since trusting the value of the message is confounded with asking a
higher share of surplus. Decoupling these two eﬀects has been analyzed by
assuming that more or less ambition in demanding a larger surplus share from
trade should go along with more or less ambition in overstating. Since the lat-
ter is not significantly aﬀected by gender (constellation) we could not confirm
that women are more suspicious although we partly found them to be more
often and to a larger extent strategizing.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the Max Planck Institute of Jena for funding and
supporting this research.
The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest.
References
Alesina, A., and La Ferrara E., 2002. Who trusts others? Journal of Public
Economics, 85(2), 207-234.
6According to our data, risk attitude does not aﬀect the results.
9
Ayres, I., and Siegelman P., 1995. Race and Gender Discrimination in Bar-
gaining for a New Car. American Economic Review, 85(3), 304-321.
Buss, D. M. (ed.), 2005. The Handbook of Evolutionary Psycology, Wiley.
Di Cagno, D., Galliera, A., Güth, W., Pace, N., Panaccione, L., 2015. Experi-
ence and Gender Eﬀects in an Acquiring-a-Company Experiment allowing
for Value Messages, mimeo.
Eagly, A. H., and Wood, W., 1999. The origins of sex diﬀerences in human
behavior: Evolved dispositions versus social roles. American Psychologist,
54, 408-423.
Eckel, C.C., and Grossman, P.J., 2001. Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum
Games, Economic Inquiry, 39(2), 171-188.
Eckel, C.C., and Grossman, P.J., 2008. Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Ex-
perimental Evidence in Handbook of Experimental Economics Results
(Plott C. and Smith V. eds.) vol.1, Ch.113, pp. 1061-1073.
Fischbacher, U., 2007. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic exper-
iments. Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171-178.
García-Gallego, A., Georgantzís, N., Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, A., 2012. Gender
diﬀerences in ultimatum games: Despite rather than due to risk attitudes,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83(1), 42-49.
Gneezy, U., and Rustichini, A., 2004. Gender and Competition at a Young
Age. American Economic Review, 94(2), 377-381.
Greiner, B., 2004. The online recruitment system orsee 2.0-a guide for the
organization of experiments in economics , University of Cologne, Working
paper series in economics, 10(23), 63-104.
Güth, W., Pull K., Stadler, M., Zaby A., 2014. Compulsory Disclosure
of Private Information: Theoretical and Experimental Results for the
"Acquiring-a-Company" Game, Jena Economic Research Paper 2014-003.
Kagel, J.H., 1995. Cross-game learning: Experimental evidence from first-price
and English common value auctions. Economics Letters, 49(2), 163-170.
Niederle, M., and Vesterlund, L., 2007. Do Women Shy Away from Competi-
tion? Do Men Compete Too Much?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
122(3), 1067-1101.
10
Riley, B.H., and McGinn, K.L., 2002. When Does Gender Matter in Nego-
tiation?. Working Paper Series rwp02-036, Harvard University, John F.
Kennedy School of Government.
Saad, G., and Tripat, G., 2001. Sex Diﬀerences in the Ultimatum Game: An
Evolutionary Psychology Perspective. Journal of Bioeconomics, 3(2), 171-
193.
Samuelson, W.F., and Bazerman, M. H., 1985. Negotiation under the winner’s
curse. Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. III, Smith, V. (ed.).
Solnick, S.J., 2001. Gender Diﬀerences in the Ultimatum Game. Economic
Inquiry, 39(2), 189-200.
Sutter, M., Bosman, R., Kocher M., Winden, F., 2009. Gender pairing and
bargaining Beware the same sex!. Experimental Economics, 12(3), 318-
331.
Thaler, R., 1988. Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 2(1), 191-202.
11
